Laas Leivat
Depending on which European capital, it’s been estimated that up to one third of the city’s Russian embassy staff could be FSB, GRU or SVR personnel. The national security/military/foreign intelligence operatives use diplomatic cover and the accompanying immunity from local prosecution for illegal operations.
This capability was severely hindered after Russia attacked Ukraine. Western counter-intelligence then doubled down on Russian diplomats, most of whom probably had been identified as spies long before, but became a current danger for Ukraine’s Western allies. These embassy-based spies were expected to ‘talent spot’ locals for recruitment, handle ‘moles and other human assets. They were also tasked with giving logistic support to ‘active measures’ teams like the non-embassy GRU operatives involved in the 2018 poisoning of their former colleague Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the U.K.
Moscow needed to fill the void and activate the dormant, boost the activities of illegals (non-diplomats) and engage foreigners. Alongside those who have enjoyed diplomatic camouflage, Russia has always managed to recruit and run foreign officials and politicians who are on Moscow’s payroll; deep cover agents, usually presenting themselves as citizens of a third country and often operating a business; and sleeper agents tasked while unobtrusively waiting and observing, building contacts and gaining access to those who would become intelligence targets.
(Pikemalt saab lugeda Eesti Elu 1. septembri 2023 paber- või digilehest eestielu.ca)